Security statement — Undelete for Jira
Last updated: 22 October 2026
Architecture, in one line
Undelete is an Atlassian Forge app. All of its code runs on Atlassian's infrastructure. There is no vendor-hosted server, no database of ours, no analytics, and no egress: the manifest declares no permissions.external.fetch, so the platform blocks any outbound call.
Who acts, and with which identity
- Copying runs on Jira events (work item created, updated, commented, deleted). There is no person behind an event, so the app reads the one work item the event refers to with its own identity, and stores the copy in Forge storage on your site. Nothing else is read.
- Everything on the admin page (listing the bin, restoring, removing entries, changing the retention) runs as the Jira administrator using it (
asUser), so Jira itself refuses whatever that person could not do by hand. - On top of that, every admin-page action first asks Jira whether the caller holds Administer Jira (
POST /rest/api/3/permissions/check) and refuses otherwise. If the answer cannot be read, the action is refused too: unknown is never treated as yes. - Identifiers coming from the browser are accepted only as numbers, with a cap per request.
Permissions requested, and why
read:jira-work— read the work item an event refers to, and receive work item and comment events.write:jira-work— create the restored work item and its comments (as the administrator).read:jira-user— show the current name of who deleted an item, without storing it.storage:app— keep the copies and the bin in Forge storage on your site.
Data handled
Copies of work items and their comments, stored in Forge storage on the customer's site. Account ids only, never names or e-mail addresses; names inside mentions are removed before saving. Attachment files are not stored. Logs contain only HTTP status codes and counts, never content. Details in the privacy policy.
Vulnerability handling
Report to support@pieranlab.cloud. We aim to acknowledge within 3 working days. Because the app has no server of ours, remediation always means publishing a new app version through the Marketplace.
Verification
- 29 automated tests run before every deploy. They exercise the real trigger and resolver code against an in-memory Jira and Forge, and check the outcome: what is in storage and which calls were made.
- Six safeguards were each switched off one at a time on 22 October 2026, and each time the test that names it turned red: the administrator check, the licence check, no personal data in storage, no overwrite of a complete bin entry, the parent of a restored sub-task, and the exclusion of the Rank field. A safeguard that breaks nothing when removed is not protecting anything.
- Verified on a live Jira Cloud site on 22 October 2026: a work item with description, labels, assignee, due date, comments and an attachment was changed, deleted and restored, and the result was read back from Jira; a parent and its sub-task deleted together were both caught and restored, with the sub-task under the new parent.